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Abstract
We propose a mathematical model to analyze the effects of anti-infection behavior on the equilibrium
states of an infectious disease. The anti-infection behavior is incorporated into a classical epidemio-
logical SIR model, by considering the behavior adoption rate across the population as an additional
variable. We consider also the effects on the adoption rate produced by the disease evolution, using
a dynamic payoff function and an additional differential equation. The equilibrium states of the
proposed model have remarkable characteristics: possible coexistence of two locally stable endemic
equilibria, the coexistence of locally stable endemic and disease-free equilibria, and even the possibility
of a stable continuum of endemic equilibrium points. We show how some of the results obtained may
be used to support strategic planning leading to effective control of the disease in the long-term.
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1. Introduction
The propagation of an infectious disease can be affected by changes in the population behavior
and, at the same time, the population behavior concerning the disease can change due to changes
in the perception of the epidemiological situation [1, 2, 3]. Most recently, in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, has been clear the relevant role played by human behavior on the disease
dynamic [4, 5, 6] and also has become evident the changes produced on the population behavior and
policymakers due to the increase in the number of infected and death cases [7, 8, 9].
Even before the COVID-19 emergency, there was a well-recognized demand for mathematical
models of infectious diseases considering aspects of the population behavior [10, 11].
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Many mathematical and computational models for infectious diseases based on SIR models have
already considered some type of anti-infection strategies. Some works have incorporated implicitly
the possibility of a dynamic preventive behavior, by considering rates of infection or transmission day
may depend on some of the epidemiological variables S, I, or R [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
For other models considering behavioral features see [21].
Vaccination, as a form of anti-infection behavior, has been considered assuming that part of the
susceptible population goes directly into the removed population or adding additional compartments
for partially immune population [22, 23, 24]. For other models considering vaccination see [25, 26, 27].
In [28] a model for vaccination-related behavior is considered using an additional variable
corresponding with the rate of vaccination at birth. This new variable interacts with the infection
dynamics in the SIR model and is affected by a differential equation that depends on the infected
population I. In the present work, we use a similar idea and introduce a behavioral variable related to
the adoption rate across the population of some anti-infection behavior. This variable is incorporated
into a classical epidemiological SIR model. The dynamics effects on the adoption rate are introduced
using an additional differential equation and a dynamic linear payoff depending on the epidemiological
variables.
We focus on the study of equilibrium states as an attempt to understand the long-term character-
istic and consequences of the interplay between population behavior and disease dynamics.
The equilibrium states of the proposed model have remarkable characteristics: possible coexistence
of two locally stable endemic equilibria, the coexistence of locally stable endemic and disease-free
equilibria, and even the possibility of a stable continuum of endemic equilibrium points. We will
describe how some of the results obtained may be used to support strategic planning leading to
effective control of the infectious disease in the long-term.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the mathematical model and discuss
some basic characteristics. In Section 3 we discuss the existence and stability of its equilibrium
points, which is the main focus of the present work. We will show that the set of equilibrium points
of the proposed model, have some remarkable characteristics in the context of epidemiological models:
coexistence of two locally stable endemic equilibria, the coexistence of locally stable endemic and
disease-free equilibria, and the possibility of a stable continuum of endemic equilibrium points. In
Section 4 we use some of the results to obtain thresholds for parameters leading to effective long-term
control of the epidemic disease. We conclude with some final remarks in Section 5 and an Appendix
presenting proofs of some of the results established in the paper.
2
2. A Mathematical Model for an Infectious Disease with an Anti-Infection behavior
Compartment models, and particularly SIR models, have been extensively used for mathematical
modeling of infectious diseases [11]. The main idea behind SIR models is to consider a population
divided into three disjoint categories or compartments: susceptible individuals, infected individuals,
and removed (recovered or deceased) individuals, denoted by S, I, and R respectively. If N denotes
the total population, then we have N = S + I +R.
Depending on the modeling approach, the variables S, I, and R may be considered as the
absolute numbers of individuals in each group or as the proportion of individuals relative to the
total population. In this work, we consider this latter approach. Therefore, considering the time
dependency, we have that S(t) + I(t) +R(t) = 1 for all t.
Within these considerations, an SIR model with vital dynamics and constant population can be
stated as
dS
dt
= µ− β S I − µS
dI
dt
= β S I − µ I − γI
dR
dt
= γ I − µR,
(1)
with S(0) + I(0) + R(0) = 1. The positive real numbers µ, β, and γ can be interpreted as birth-
mortality rate, infection rate, and recovery rate respectively. The constant population consideration
is implicit into the system, since N(t) = 1 is the only solution of
dN
dt
=
dS
dt
+
dI
dt
+
dR
dt
= µ(1−N)
satisfying N(0) = 1. For more details about SIR-type models see [25, 26].
Now, consider that there is some behavior or action that can be taken to avoid or reduce the
impact of the infection. This behavior can be interpreted as a vaccination initiative, a preventive
hygienic measure, a quarantine restraint, or a combination of similar actions. Let x be the proportion
of the population following this anti-infection behavior.
When the population is considering this behavior or action, the perception of the benefit obtained
by following it, may not always be constant. In fact, depending on the epidemiological state, the
benefit may vary. For example, in a situation with a small proportion of infected, the benefit of
adopting the anti-infection behavior may be considered irrelevant for some part of the population.
On the other hand, in a situation where the majority of the population has no immunity, the
benefits may be considered high. To analyze this kind of situation, we propose to consider that there
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exists a perceived payoff or benefit obtained from the anti-infection behavior that depends on the
epidemiological variables S, I, and R according to a function p given by
p(S, I,R) = −ac + aI I + aS S + aRR, (2)
where ac, aI , aS , and aR are positive constants. The constant ac can be interpreted as the fixed
cost of adopting the anti-infection behavior, and the constants aI , aS , and aR can be interpreted as
the behavior-adoption benefit associated with the proportion of infected, susceptible, and removed
members of the population, respectively. As we have considered that S + I +R = 1, we have that
−ac + aI I + aS S + aRR = −ac + aI I + aS S + aR (1− S − I)
= −(ac − aR) + (aI − aR) I + (aS − aR)S
= −a0 + a1 I + a2 S.
Therefore, the payoff functions can be simplified to obtain
p(S, I) = −a0 + a1 I + a2 S. (3)
Based on the SIR model (1) and the payoff function (3), we propose the following model considering
simultaneously the epidemiological variables (S, I,R) and the behavioral state x:
dS
dt
= µ− (1− x)β S I − µS
dI
dt
= (1− x)β S I − µ I − γI
dR
dt
= γ I − µR
dx
dt
= x(1− x)(−a0 + a1 I + a2 S)
(4)
with initial conditions in [0, 1], and N(0) = S(0) + I(0) +R(0) = 1. The three initials equations are
essentially the SIR model (1) with a variable infection rate depending on the behavioral variable x. If
x = 1, there is no infection at all. If x = 0, the diseases follow the classical SIR dynamics. The fourth
equation may be seen as a logistic equation for x with a growth rate depending on the variables
S and I and on the cost/payoff parameters a0, a1, a2. Thus, depending on the interplay between
these values over time, the adoption rate x may increase or decrease, leading also to a dynamically
decreasing or increasing infection rate. The differential equation for x can also be obtained from the
replicator equations in evolutionary game theory (see [29]), applied to a two-behavior game (follow
or not follow the anti-infection behavior) with a symmetric payoff given by −a0 + a1 I + a2 S.
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The main goal of the present work is to study the long-term behavior of model (4) in terms of its
equilibrium points. To achieve this, we will consider a simplified model obtained by re-scaling some
of the parameters. Considering
τ = tµ; β˜ =
β
µ
; γ˜ =
γ
µ
; a˜0 =
a0
µ
; a˜1 =
a1
µ
; a˜2 =
a2
µ
k = 1 +
γ
µ
= 1 + γ˜ and R0 =
β
µ+ γ
=
β˜
1 + γ˜
=
β˜
k
. (5)
and replacing in (4), we obtain
dS
dτ
= 1− (1− x)kR0 S I − S
dI
dτ
= (1− x)kR0 S I − kI
dR
dτ
= (k − 1) I −R
dx
dτ
= x(1− x)(−a˜0 + a˜1 I + a˜2 S),
(6)
with initial conditions in [0, 1] and N(0) = S(0) + I(0) +R(0) = 1.
Note that the parameter k > 1 and the parameter R0 is also a positive real number. The
parameter R0 is called the basic reproduction number and has a fundamental role in the description
of the equilibria stability in the classical SIR model [25, 26]. The parameter R0 can be interpreted
as the number of cases one case generates, on average, in an uninfected population. It represents a
measure of the effectiveness of the infection. We introduce below the term Rp, that will be important
in the forthcoming analysis of equilibrium points
Rp =
a˜1 − ka˜2
a˜1 − ka˜0 .
Note that Rp depends both on the payoffs associated with the anti-infection behavior and on the
population parameter k = 1 + γµ . We will see in Section 3 that under the effects of the anti-infection
behavior, the constant Rp plays a similar role to the one played by the basic reproduction number
R0 in the classical SIR model.
We end this section proving that the variables in (6) properly represent population proportions,
in the sense that S, I,R and x belongs to the interval [0, 1] for all t > 0, and that N(τ) =
S(τ) + I(τ) +R(τ) = 1 .
Lemma 1. The set Ω = {x ∈ [0, 1], S ≥ 0, I ≥ 0, R ≥ 0 and S + I +R = 1} is positively invariant
under (6).
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Proof. Since x(τ) = 1 and x(τ) = 0 are stationary solutions of
dx
dτ
= x(1− x)(−a˜0 + a˜1 I + a˜2 S),
the uniqueness of solutions ensures that x(τ) ∈ [0, 1] for all τ > 0, whenever x(0) ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, from (6) we have that dNdτ = µ (1−N). Since N(0) = 1, follows that S(τ)+I(τ)+R(τ) =
N(τ) = 1 for all τ > 0.
To prove that S, I, and R are positives, we analyze the behavior of the solutions with initial
conditions at the border of R3>0.
Case 1. If S(0) = 0 then dSdτ (0) = 1 > 0, therefore S grows locally.
Case 2. If I(0) = 0 then dIdτ (0) = 0, therefore I(τ) will remain non-negative.
Case 3. If R(0) = 0 then dRdτ (0) = (k − 1)I(0). In this case, if I(0) = 0, then dRdτ (0) = 0, whence R
will remain non-negative. On the other hand, if I(0) > 0 then dRdτ (0) > 0 since k > 1. Thus
R grows locally.
3. Equilibrium States
3.1. Existence
In this subsection, we determine all the possible equilibrium points of model (6) and its conditions
for existence. The following lemma summarizes the results regarding the six different classes of
equilibrium points that can be obtained.
Lemma 2. Any equilibrium point P = (S¯, I¯, R¯, x¯) of model (6) satisfies that I¯ = 1k
(
1− S¯)
and R¯ =
(
1− 1k
) (
1− S¯). Thus all equilibrium points are determined by the values of S¯ and x¯.
Furthermore, all the equilibrium points of model (6) fall into one of the following categories:
P1: S¯ = 1 and x¯ = 0;
P2: S¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1;
P3: S¯ = 1 and x¯ ∈ [0, 1], s.t. a˜0 = a˜2;
P4: S¯ = 1R0 and x¯ = 0, s.t. R0 > 1;
P5: S¯ = 1Rp and x¯ = 1−
Rp
R0
, s.t. R0 > Rp > 1 and a˜1 6= ka˜0;
P6: S¯ = 1R0(1−x¯) and x¯ ∈
(
0, R0−1R0
)
, s.t. R0 > 1 and ka˜0 = a˜1 = ka˜2.
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Proof. The equilibrium points of (6) are the solutions in Ω of the non-linear system
1− (1− x¯)kR0 S¯ I¯ − S¯ = 0
(1− x¯)kR0 S¯ I¯ − kI¯ = 0
(k − 1) I¯ − R¯ = 0
x¯(1− x¯)[−a˜0 + a˜1 I¯ + a˜2 S¯] = 0.
(7)
Note from the first equation that S¯ can not be equal to zero. Now, adding the first two equations
in (7), we obtain that any equilibrium point must satisfy 1− S¯ = kI¯. Therefore
I¯ =
1
k
(
1− S¯) (8)
and thus, from third equation in (7), follows that
R¯ =
(
1− 1
k
)(
1− S¯) . (9)
Thus, if S¯ = 1, then (8) and (9) implies that I¯ = R¯ = 0 and the expressions for equilibrium types
P1, P2 and P3 can be obtain from fourth equation in (7).
If S¯ 6= 1, then (8) implies that I¯ 6= 0. Thus, from second equation in (7), we obtain
(1− x¯)R0S¯ = 1,
which implies that in this case x¯ 6= 1 and therefore
S¯ =
1
R0(1− x¯) . (10)
Equation (10) implies the expression for equilibrium P4 but additionally, can be used jointly with
equation (8) and the fact that Rp = a˜1−ka˜2a˜1−ka˜0 , obtain by basic manipulations of the fourth equation
in (7), the expressions and conditions defining P5 and P6 .
3.2. Comments on Lemma 2
Model (6) has more possible equilibrium points that the classic SIR model. Indeed, the classical
SIR model has only two equilibrium points: a disease-free equilibrium and an endemic equilibrium
that corresponds precisely to equilibria P1 and P4. In addition, model (6) have other disease-free
equilibria (P2 and P3) and other endemic equilibria (P5 and P6).
The equilibrium points P1 and P2 differs only in the last component: in P1 no one is adopting
the anti-infection behavior and in P2 all population does. Although P2 seems an ideal scenario, it
may not be realistic even if the prevention policy has an insignificant cost.
7
Equilibrium type P3 also differs from P1 only in the last component. However, note that P3
represents an infinite set of equilibrium, since for each x¯ we obtain a different equilibrium point.
In particular, P3 include P1 and P2 when x¯ = 0 and x¯ = 1, respectively. In fact, P3 represents a
connected path between these two disease-free equilibria.
Note that the family of equilibria P3 exists only if a˜0 = a˜2. In terms of the original parameters,
this is equivalent to ac = aS , that is, the fixed cost has to be exactly equal to the payoff associated
with the proportion of susceptible members of the population. Such equality between parameters
may be unrealistic, thus we consider P3 of minor practical interest. This also applies to equilibrium
family P6 which has also a condition for its existence involving equality between parameters.
As mentioned before, P4 corresponds to the endemic equilibrium of the classical SIR model and
has the same existence condition (R0 > 1) in that context.
In turn, the equilibrium point P5 does not coincide with any equilibrium of the classic SIR model
and can be considered as a more realistic scenario. In the P5 case, the infection is present (I¯ 6= 0)
and only a part of the population adopted the anti-infection behavior. Note also that the condition
Rp < R0, implies that the proportion of the susceptible population in P5 is greater than in P4.
Consequently, the proportion of infected population in P5 is lower than in P4. Therefore, P5 can be
interpreted as a desirable situation where anti-infection behavior reduces the impact
of the disease in the long-term.
Note also that in this P5 scenario, for a fixed value of R0, the larger is Rp, the smaller is the
proportion of infected people. This relationship between R0, a parameter related only to the disease,
and Rp, a parameter related to the cost of intervention, allows an analysis of the effects of behavior
and cost/payoff changes in the disease dynamic. The best-case scenario would be one with a minimal
value for I¯, or equivalently, a maximal value for x¯. This will occur if Rp tends to 1 and in the limit
this will imply a˜2 = a˜0 (existence condition of P3).
The worst-case scenario for P5 would be one where Rp goes to R0 because in this case, x¯ goes to
zero and P5 goes to P4.
Equilibrium type P6 represents an infinite set of endemics equilibrium points, one for each
x¯ ∈
(
0, R0−1R0
)
. Unlike disease-free equilibria P3, in P6 the value of x¯ will affect the value of S¯ (I¯ and
R¯ too). Note that if x¯ approach R0−1R0 , then S¯ approach 1. This means that if the proportion of the
population adopting the prevention behavior increase, the proportion of susceptible population also
increases (and the proportion of infected population decrease).
Note that, when x¯ goes to 0, P6 goes to P4, and when x¯ = R0−1R0 , the equilibrium P6 goes to a
8
P3 equilibrium point. In fact, when ka˜0 = a˜1 = ka˜2 both sets of equilibria P3 and P6 coexist and
have a linking point at
(
1, 0, 0, R0−1R0
)
. Lastly, note that equilibrium points P6 cannot co-exist with
equilibrium point P5, since its existence conditions are incompatible.
3.3. Jacobian Matrix and its Characteristic Polynomial
We are interested in study the stability of equilibrium points of (6). Then, it will be useful to
consider the associated Jacobian matrix given by:
J(S,I,R,x)=

−(1− x)IkR0 − 1 −(1− x)kR0S 0 IkR0S
(1− x)IkR0 (1− x)kR0S − k 0 −IkR0S
0 k − 1 −1 0
(1− x)xa˜2 (1− x)xa˜1 0 (1− 2x)(−a˜0 + a˜1I + a˜2S)
 .
The characteristic polynomial of J(S, I,R, x) can be written as:
p(λ) = |J(S, I,R, x)− λI| = (−1− λ)q(λ) (11)
where
q(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−(1− x)IkR0 − 1− λ −(1− x)kR0S IkR0S
(1− x)IkR0 (1− x)kR0S − k − λ −IkR0S
(1− x)xa˜2 (1− x)xa˜1 (1− 2x)(−a˜0 + a˜1I + a˜2S)− λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
3.4. Stability of P1, P2, P4, and P5
It is clear from (11) that for any equilibrium point, the Jacobian has at least one negative
eigenvalue λ1 = −1 and that additional eigenvalues can be studied analyzing the equation q(λ) = 0.
This can be used to establish the following subsection result about the stability of equilibrium points
P1, P2, P4, and P5 whose complete proof is presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Consider system (6). Assume that a˜0 6= a˜2, a˜0 6= a˜1/k, R0 6= 1, and R0 6= Rp.
1. If R0 < 1 then
i. P1 is locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 > a˜2;
ii. P2 is locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 < a˜2,
iii. P4 and P5 do not exist.
2. If R0 > 1 and R0 < Rp, then
i. P4 is locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 > a˜2;
ii. P2 is locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 < a˜2;
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iii. P1 is not stable;
iv. P5 do not exist.
3. If R0 > 1 and R0 > Rp,
i. P5 is locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 > a˜2, and a˜0 < a˜1/k;
ii. P4 is locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 > a˜2, and a˜0 > a˜1/k;
iii. P2 is locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 < a˜2, and a˜0 < a˜1/k;
iv. P2 and P4 are locally asymptotically stable if a˜0 < a˜2, and a˜0 > a˜1/k;
v. P1 is not stable.
3.5. Comments on Theorem 1
In the classic SIR model (1), when the basic replication rate is sufficiently low (R0 < 1), the
disease-free equilibrium point is stable, so the infection does not become an epidemic. As described
in Theorem 1, this phenomenon also occurs in system (6) but in this case, there are two possible
disease-free equilibrium: P1 (zero behavior adoption) and P2 (complete behavior adoption). The
values of a˜0 and a˜2 determine which one is stable.
When the disease is more infectious (R0 > 1), the classic SIR model admits only one possibility:
the endemic equilibrium is stable and the disease-free equilibrium is unstable. Cases (2i) and (3ii) of
the Theorem 1 are equivalent to this situation, since P4 is equivalent to the endemic equilibrium of
the classical SIR model. However, in model (6) some more realistic behaviors may occur. Note for
example that it is possible that a disease-free equilibrium P1 and the endemic equilibrium P4 coexist
simultaneously, both being locally stable (Theorem 1 (3iii)). Figure 1(a) illustrates this interesting
case. Note also that in this situation, equilibrium points P1 and P5 also exist but are not stable.
From Theorem 1 (2ii) and (3ii) another remarkable behavior can be observed, even if R0 > 1, it is
possible that the system has a disease-free and unique stable equilibrium. Figure 1(b) illustrates this
situation. In this case, the equilibrium P1 exists and is unstable and equilibrium P5 does not exit.
Finally, besides P4, we have the possibility of another endemic stable equilibrium: the equilibrium
point P5. Assuming that conditions of Theorem 1 (3i) are satisfied, equilibria P1, P2, and P5 exists,
but only the last one is stable. This equilibrium is particularly interesting because it represents a
more favorable epidemiological situation than the equilibrium point P4. Indeed, as Rp < R0, the
value of I¯ at P5 is smaller than the value of I¯ at P4.
10
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(a) Coexistence of Stable Equilibrium P2 (in
blue) and P4 (in red).
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(b) P2 (in blue) stable with R0 > 1.
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(c) Locally Stable Equilibrium P5 (in orange).
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(d) Coexistence of the Families P3 (in blue) and
P6 (in red).
Figure 1: Solution curves I(τ) × x(τ) of system (6). Numerical simulations of solutions with different
initial conditions. Temporal evolution is represented using dark green for initial trajectory points and a
gradual variation to yellow as time increase. The equilibrium points P1, P2, P4, and P5 are denoted by the
dots in the color black, blue, red, and orange, respectively, while the families of equilibria P3 and P6 are
denoted by the lines in the color blue and red, respectively (when they exist). In all cases pictured k = 2 and
R0 = 5. In 1(a) a˜0 = a˜1 = 1 and a˜2 = 2. Thus Rp = 3 and R0 > max{1, Rp}, ensuring that P2 and P4 are
both locally stable, while P1 and P5 are unstable (the instability of P5 is highlighted in zoom). In 1(b) a˜0 = 1,
a˜1 = 7, and a˜2 = 2. Thus Rp = 0.6 and R0 > max{1, Rp}, ensuring that P2 are locally stable, while P1 and
P4 are unstable. In 1(c) a˜0 = 3, a˜1 = 7, and a˜2 = 2. Thus Rp = 3, R0 > max{1, Rp}, and a˜1/k > a˜0 > a˜2,
ensuring that P5 are locally stable, while P1, P2, and P4 are unstable. In 1(d) a˜0 = a˜2 = 1 and a˜1 = 2. Thus,
Theorem 1 ensures that whole family P6 is stable.
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3.6. On the stability of equilibria family P6
As mentioned before, the existence conditions for equilibrium families P3 and P6 involve equality
between some parameters which can be unrealistic. The corresponding stability analysis can not be
done using the standard approach based on the Jacobian matrix as in Theorem 1, because in this
cases, the corresponding Jacobian matrix have a null eigenvalue. In fact, solving equation (11) for
equilibrium P3 equilibrium lead us to
λ1 = −1, λ2 = −1, λ3 = 0 and λ4 = k(R0(1− x¯)− 1),
and in a similar fashion, the P6 equilibrium points also have a null eigenvalue 1.
It can be noted however that some points in the equilibrium family P3 may be locally stable, as
illustrated in the Figure 1(d). When x¯ = R0−1R0 , then P6 becomes (1, 0, 0, x¯), so this point is a linking
point between P6 and P3. Note that this point acts as the threshold between stable and unstable
equilibrium points in P3.
Nevertheless, a closer look at system (6) and to the conditions for the existence of P6, allow us to
determine some stability conditions for equilibria P6 presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume that in model (6) we have R0 > 1 and ka˜0 = a˜1 = ka˜2, so the family of
equilibria P6 exists. If − R0k(R0−1)(k−1) < a˜0, then the family of equilibria P6 is stable.
Proof. Note first that if − R0k(R0−1)(k−1) < a˜0 then for all x¯ ∈
(
0, R0−1R0
)
we have that
−(1− x¯)R0k
x¯(k − 1) < a˜0, (12)
because 0 < x¯ < R0−1R0 implies that −1−x¯x¯ < − 1R0−1 . Now, if ka˜0 = a˜1 = ka˜2, we have from third
and fourth equation of the system (6) that
dx
dτ
= x(1− x)[−a˜0 + ka˜0 I + a˜0 S]
= a˜0x(1− x)[(k − 1)I −R]
= a˜0x(1− x)dR
dτ
.
Thus, we have that
dx
dR
= a˜0x(1− x),
1Null eigenvalues appears also for P1 if a˜2 = a˜0 or R0 = 1, and for P2 when a˜2 = a˜0
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and we can express x in terms of R as
x(R) =
ea˜0R
ea˜0R + C1
.
This consideration allows us to eliminate the differential equation for x in (6) and using that
S = 1− I −R, we can reduce model (6) to a simplified epidemic model with a recovered-dependant
infection described as
dI
dτ
= I[f(R) (1− I −R)− k]
dR
dτ
= (k − 1) I −R,
(13)
where f(R) = (1− x(R))kR0. Recovered-dependent epidemic models as (13) were considered by the
authors in [20]. In particular, Theorem 4.3 in [20] establish the following result:
If f is positive function, differentiable on [0, 1] and (I∗, R∗) is an endemic equilibrium point of (13)
such that dfdR(R
∗) < 1k−1f
2(R∗) then (I∗, R∗) is a locally stable equilibrium point.
Note that if f(R) = (1− x(R))kR0, f is in fact a positive differentiable function on R. Additionally,
the following inequalities equivalences holds:
df
dR
(R∗) <
1
k − 1f
2(R∗)
−kR0 dx
dR
<
1
k − 1f
2(R∗)
−kR0a˜0x(1− x) < (1− x)
2k2R20
k − 1
−a˜0x < (1− x)kR0
k − 1
−(1− x)R0k
x(k − 1) < a˜0,
which we already showed in (12) is valid when − R0k(R0−1)(k−1) < a˜0. Therefore, we conclude that the
whole family of equilibria P6 is stable.
4. Controlling the infection through population behavior: Choosing the right payoffs
In this section, we use the results in Theorem 1 to find conditions on the behavioral payoffs, that
produce a diminishing on the infected population at a stable equilibrium. This can be interpreted as
specific policy actions leading to reduce and control the infection in the long-term.
According to system (6), an infectious disease with a small replication rate (R0 < 1), requires
no anti-infection behavior to be eradicated, since the possible stable points P1 and P2 are both
disease-free. Nevertheless, the stability conditions in part 1. of Theorem 1 can be rewritten in terms
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of the original parameters as follows: if ac > as, then P1 is locally asymptotically stable; if ac < as,
then P2 is locally asymptotically stable. This can be interpreted in terms of public policies, as a
quantification of how much reduction on the fixed cost ac is necessary to achieve full adoption of
an anti-infection behavior; if ac is smaller than as, then in the long-term everyone tends to
follow the prevention behavior, even if the disease is poorly infectious (R0 < 1).
We focus now on the situation when R0 > 1 and therefore, the infectious disease may became
endemic. We aim to determine, in terms of Rp, ac, aS , aI , and aR, successful intervention strategies
to control the disease. We consider two scenarios:
Scenario 1: Assume that ac < aS and therefore a˜0 < a˜2. In this case, from parts 2. and 3.
in Theorem 1 we have two possibilities: only the disease-free equilibrium P2 is stable (cases (2ii)
and (3iv)), or P2 and the endemic equilibrium P4 are stables (case (3iii)).
From the epidemiological point of view, we would like to avoid the case of stability of an endemic
equilibrium. Therefore, to avoid the stability of P4, we must ensure that a˜0 < a˜1/k, that
is, besides ac < aS, we need that ac < aIk + aR
(
1− 1k
)
.
This is an ideal scenario that can be interpreted as disease eradication in the long-run.
Scenario 2: Consider now that ac > aS (so a˜0 > a˜2), and still R0 > 1.
In this case, the locally stable points will always be endemic: P4 (cases (2i) and (3ii)) or P5
(case (3i)). Note however that, if P5 exists (Rp < R0), this equilibrium will represent a better situation
than P4, since the proportion of infected in P5 will be lower than in P4. Although R0 does not depend
on the payoff parameters, Rp does, therefore in order to obtain a lower proportion of infected,
we must seek strategies such that the payoff parameters imply Rp < R0. Furthermore,
it is not enough that P5 exists, we want P5 to be stable. Then, in addition to a˜0 > a˜2
and Rp < R0, we must also be sure that a˜0 < a˜1/k.
Note also that the components of P5 depend on the value of Rp and if Rp goes to 1, the proportion
of infected persons predicted by this equilibrium decrease. Given an infectious disease with R0 > 1,
whereas it is not possible to change the inequality a˜0 > a˜2, it is possible to decrease the number of
infected people ensuring that a˜0 be less than a˜1/k (so P5 is stable) and as close as possible to a˜2.
In this scenario, it is possible to quantify precisely the percentage of reduction on the infected
population, produced by changes in the payoff parameters, as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider system (6) and assume that R0 > 1 and a˜2 < a˜0 < a˜1/k. A reduction
of p% in a˜0 produce a reduction of
(
a˜0
a˜1−ka˜2
)
p percentage points in the infected population on the
endemic equilibrium state P5 and a relative reduction of a˜0a˜0−a˜2 p%.
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Proof. We can compute the percentage point reduction by computing the difference between the old
value of the proportion of the infected population at the equilibrium point P5 (denoted by I¯) and
the new value (denoted by Î) obtained after the reduction on a0. Note that
I¯ = 1k
(
1− 1Rp
)
= 1k
(
1− a˜1−ka˜0a˜1−ka˜2
)
= a˜0−a˜2a˜1−ka˜2 ,
so we have that
I¯ − Î = a˜0 − a˜2
a˜1 − ka˜2 −
(1− p100)a˜0 − a˜2
a˜1 − ka˜2
=
a˜0
a˜1 − ka˜2
p
100
.
Therefore, the reduction of p% in a˜0 can be interpreted as a reduction, in the long-term, of
(
a˜0
a˜1−ka˜2
)
p
percentage points in the proportion of infected population.
The corresponding relative reduction can be obtained as
(I¯ − Î)100
I¯
=
a˜0
a˜1 − ka˜2
a˜1 − ka˜2
a˜0 − a˜2 p
=
a˜0
a˜0 − a˜2 p.
So, a reduction of p% in a˜0 can be interpreted as a reduction, in the long-term, of a˜0a˜0−a˜2 p% in the
proportion of infected population.
Example Recent measles outbreaks have been associated with a lack of effective vaccination,
mainly due to misinformation on the inherent risks of vaccines [30]. In terms of the model proposed
in this paper, erroneously high valuations on vaccination risk could be interpreted as a high value for
ac or equivalently, a high value for a˜0. In this context, it is relevant to ask how much a˜0 must be
reduced to obtain, for example, a reduction of 1 percentage point on the infected population in the
long-term. Under conditions on Proposition 1, this desired one percentage point reduction can be
obtained by a reduction of
(
a˜1−ka˜2
a˜0
)
% in a˜0.
To obtain useful insights from last expression, besides considering the limitations and partial
validity of using the proposed model for this specific disease, one should also be able to have estimation
of k, a˜0, a˜1, and a˜2. These last parameters were just introduced in the present paper and as such,
there are not estimations available yet.
For illustration purposes, we present in Figure 4 a heat map for p, the percentage reduction on
a0, depending on the values of a˜1 and a˜2, that would be necessary to obtain a 1 percentage point
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reduction on the infected population in the long-term, considering the value of a0 as a normalized
quantity equals to 1 and an estimated2 value of k equals to 3.8.
From this estimations, we have for example that, if in comparison with a˜0, a˜1 is 10 times greater
and a˜2 is a half, then, to obtain a 1 percentage point reduction on the infected population in the
long-term it is necessary at least a reduction of 8.1% on a˜0.
Figure 2: Heat map for p. Necessary percentage reduction on a0 (p), depending on the values of a˜1 and a˜2,
to obtain a reduction of 1 percentage point on the measles infected population in the long-term
5. Final Comments
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a mathematical model to analyze the
interplay between infectious disease and anti-infection behavior adoption across the population. We
focused on equilibrium states (Lemma 2) and showed the appearance of remarkable characteristics
in the context of epidemiological models (Theorem 1), such as the coexistence of two locally stable
endemic equilibria, the coexistence of a locally stable endemic and a disease-free equilibrium, and
even the possibility of a stable continuum of endemic equilibrium points (Theorem 2). We determine
2An estimation of k could be obtained from the equality R0 = βµ+γ =
β
µk
in (5) so k = β
R0µ
. For measles, R0
is commonly considered between 12-18, and in this example we consider it equals to 18. As discussed in [31], this
estimation may not be adequate for all kinds of populations. The risk of transmission of an infectious disease is closely
related to the infection rate β and we consider the worst-case scenario where both parameters are equals. For measles,
we consider this value equal to 90% [32] The constant µ can be estimated as the inverse of the mean life expectancy
and we are considering µ = 1
76
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also the effects of some payoff reduction on the infected population size in an endemic equilibrium
(Proposition 1). The expressions obtained in Proposition 1 could be used as a threshold to estimate
costs/payoff policies leading to long-term effective control of an epidemic infection through anti-
infection behavior. Note that the relative reduction index obtained, depends only on the payoff
parameters and not on the epidemiological parameters of the disease, therefore, it would be necessary
to develop methods to estimate these payoff parameters for specific diseases and model validation
from real data.
Other directions may be followed after the present work, to achieve real practical applicability of
this kind of behavioral epidemiology modeling. It would be reasonable to consider that the payoff
function for the behavioral variable x, for the epidemiological variables, may not be linear. Also,
it would be reasonable to consider that the payoff parameters are not necessarily constants and
may vary on time. Different ways to model the variation and the effects of the behavioral variable
x can also be considered. Other models different from SIR can be suitable for specific situations,
including models considering delay differential equations to incorporate delayed effects/variations on
the behavior adoption rate. We consider that the results obtained in the present work open valuable
paths of research.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
In this Appendix, we present the proof of Theorem 1 based on the Jacobian matrix and charac-
teristic polynomial (11).
As mentioned before, any equilibrium point has at least one eigenvalue λ1 = −1, and the other
eigenvalues can be studied by analyzing the equation q(λ) = 0 for P1, P2, P4, and P5. This is
described as follows.
Case: P1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)
In this case, we have
q(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1− λ −kR0 0
0 kR0 − k − λ 0
0 0 −a˜0 + a˜2 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Thence, the additional eigenvalues are
λ2 = −1, λ3 = k(R0 − 1) and λ4 = a˜2 − a˜0.
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Therefore, if R0 < 1 and a˜2 < a˜0, then all eigenvalues will be negative and, consequently, P1 is locally
asymptotically stable. If R0 > 1 or a˜2 > a˜0, then P1 is not stable.
Case: P2 = (1, 0, 0, 1)
In this case, we obtain
q(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1− λ 0 0
0 −k − λ 0
0 0 a˜0 − a˜2 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Thence, the additional eigenvalues are
λ2 = −1, λ3 = −k, and λ4 = a˜0 − a˜2.
Therefore, it is sufficient that a˜0 < a˜2 for P2 to be locally asymptotically stable. If a˜0 > a˜2, then P2
is not stable.
Case: P4 =
(
1
R0
, 1k
(
1− 1R0
)
,
(
1− 1k
) (
1− 1R0
)
, 0
)
In this case, we have that
q(λ)=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(
1− 1R0
)
R0 − 1− λ −k 1− 1R0(
1− 1R0
)
R0 −λ 1R0 − 1
0 0 −a˜0 +
a˜1
(
1− 1
R0
)
k +
a˜2
R0
− λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=q1(λ)q2(λ),
where
q1(λ) =
R0(a˜1 − a˜0k)− a˜1 + a˜2k
kR0
− λ and
q2(λ) = λ
2 + λ
((
1− 1
R0
)
R0 + 1
)
+ k
(
1− 1
R0
)
R0.
Thence, the additional eigenvalues are λ2 =
R0(a˜1−a˜0k)−a˜1+a˜2k
kR0
(the root of q1) and the roots of the
quadratic polynomial q2. If R0 > 1, then the coefficients of q2 are all positives and therefore from the
Routh–Hurwitz criterion, we conclude that eigenvalues associated with this polynomial must have
negative real part. Note also that in this case λ2 < 0, if and only if R0(a˜1 − a˜0k)− a˜1 + a˜2k < 0 or,
equivalently, R0(a˜1 − a˜0k) < a˜1 − a˜2k.
Therefore, λ2 < 0 if and only if
• a˜1 − a˜0k > 0 and R0 < a˜1−a˜2ka˜1−a˜0k = Rp, or
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• a˜1 − a˜0k < 0 and R0 > a˜1−a˜2ka˜1−a˜0k = Rp, or
• a˜1 − a˜0k = 0 and a˜1 − a˜2k > 0.
If any of these conditions are satisfied, then P4 is locally asymptotically stable.
Case: P5 =
(
1
Rp
, 1k
(
1− 1Rp
)
,
(
1− 1k
) (
1− 1Rp
)
, 1− RpR0
)
In this case we obtain
q(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−Rp − λ −k R0R2p (Rp − 1)
Rp − 1 −λ −R0R2p (Rp − 1)
a˜2(R0−Rp)Rp
R20
a˜1(R0−Rp)Rp
R20
−λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −λ3 − C2λ2 − C1λ− C0,
where
C2 = Rp
C1 =
(Rp − 1)
R0Rp
((R0 −Rp)(a˜1 − a˜2) + kR0Rp) , and
C0 =
(a˜1 − a˜2k)(R0 −Rp)(Rp − 1)
R0Rp
.
According to the Routh-Hurwitz criterion, the roots of −q (also roots of q) will have the negative
real part if, and only if,
C2 > 0, C0 > 0 and C2C1 − C0 > 0.
If 1 < Rp < R0, then we have immediately that C2 = Rp > 0. Furthermore, in this case for
C0 > 0 it is necessary and sufficient that
a˜1 − a˜2k > 0. (A.1)
Additionally, note that
C2C1 − C0 = (Rp − 1)(R0 −Rp)
R0
[
(a˜0k − a˜2) + kR0Rp
R0 −Rp
]
since (a˜1 − a˜0k)Rp = (a˜1 − a˜0k) a˜1−a˜2ka˜1−a˜0k = a˜1 − a˜2k.
Considering that R0 > 0, Rp > 1 and R0 > Rp, then
C2C1 − C0 > 0⇔ (a˜0k − a˜2) + kR0Rp
R0 −Rp > 0
⇔ a˜2 < k
(
a˜0 +
R0Rp
R0 −Rp
)
. (A.2)
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That is, P5 is locally asymptotically stable, if and only if, (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied (s.t. the
conditions of P5 existence).
Remember that the existence conditions for P5 are
a˜1 6= ka˜0 (A.3)
1 < Rp < R0. (A.4)
Since Rp = a˜1−ka˜2a˜1−ka˜0 , to analyze inequality (A.4) we separate (A.3) in two cases:
Case 1: a˜1 − ka˜0 > 0.
Multiplying (A.4) by a˜1 − ka˜0 we have
a˜1 − ka˜0 < a˜1 − ka˜2 < R0(a˜1 − ka˜0)
⇒− ka˜0 < −ka˜2 < R0(a˜1 − ka˜0)− a˜1
⇒ka˜0 > ka˜2 > −R0(a˜1 − ka˜0) + a˜1.
Joining the last inequality with the hypothesis considered in this case we have
a˜1 > ka˜0 > ka˜2 > −R0(a˜1 − ka˜0) + a˜1. (A.5)
Case 2: a˜1 − ka˜0 < 0.
Analogously to the previous case, we will have
a˜1 < ka˜0 < ka˜2 < −R0(a˜1 − ka˜0) + a˜1.
Note that, in order to ensure P5 stability, is necessary that a˜1 > a˜2k (condition (A.1)), which
only occurs in (A.5). However, if (A.5) is satisfied, since k > 1 and R0 > Rp we have that
a˜2 < ka˜2 < ka˜0 < ka˜0 + k
R0Rp
R0 −Rp .
That is, in the case (A.5) the condition (A.2) is always satisfied.
Summarizing:
• If a˜1 > ka˜0 > ka˜2 > −R0(a˜1 − ka˜0) + a˜1, then P5 exists and is locally asymptotically stable.
• If a˜1 < ka˜0 < ka˜2 < −R0(a˜1 − ka˜0) + a˜1, then P5 exists but is not stable.
• In other cases P5 does not exist.
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